Introduction: The New Geology Of Power
There is a geopolitical dimension to the periodic table that previous generations of Indian administrators rarely had to consider. The mineral composition of the earth’s crust is not new knowledge, but what is new is the industrial architecture that now sits atop it. Electric vehicle batteries require lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite and manganese. Wind turbines need neodymium and dysprosium; rare earth elements whose names most citizens cannot pronounce but whose absence would bring an energy transition to a standstill. Semiconductor chips, the nervous system of the modern economy, depend on gallium, germanium and silicon. Defence systems, from precision-guided missiles to night-vision equipment and submarine sonars, require tungsten, cobalt, titanium, beryllium and rare earth magnets that make India’s entire defence modernisation programme strategically contingent on a handful of minerals. As The Economist observed in its landmark coverage of the critical minerals race, these materials have become “the oil of the 21st century” and the nations that control them will exercise a form of leverage that no amount of diplomatic goodwill can easily offset. [1]
India faces this reality from a position of structural vulnerability. While India possesses coal, iron ore, bauxite and limestone in abundance, it imports between 60% and 100% of most critical minerals required for frontier technology applications. It is overwhelmingly dependent on a single country China for processing and refining capacity across the mineral supply chain. And its domestic policy architecture, until very recently, was not calibrated to treat this as the national security issue it plainly is. The National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM), launched by the Union Cabinet on 29 January 2025 with an outlay of Rs.34,300 crore over seven years, represents India’s most serious effort yet to change this equation. [2,3] This article traces the context of India’s critical mineral challenge, the structure of China’s dominance, the design of India’s policy response, the environmental risks that must be managed, and the roadmap that India needs to make self-reliance a reality rather than an aspiration.
What Are Critical Minerals And Why Do They Matter?
The Government of India’s Ministry of Mines, following an inter-ministerial process involving EU-style assessment frameworks based on economic importance and supply risk, identified 30 critical minerals in 2022–23 and notified them under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (MMDR Act). [4] The list includes: Antimony, Beryllium, Bismuth, Cobalt, Copper, Gallium, Germanium, Graphite, Hafnium, Indium, Lithium, Molybdenum, Niobium, Nickel, Platinum Group Elements (PGE), Phosphorous, Potash, Rare Earth Elements (REE), Rhenium, Silicon, Strontium, Tantalum, Tellurium, Tin, Titanium, Tungsten, Vanadium, Zirconium, Selenium and Cadmium. [5]
Critical minerals are not an abstraction confined to laboratories or battlefields. They are embedded in the daily life of every Indian citizen and in every dimension of the state’s strategic capacity.
Consider the following application map:
A smartphone in a schoolchild’s hand in Patna contains cobalt from the Democratic Republic of Congo, processed in China, alongside tantalum from Rwanda, tin from Indonesia and tungsten from China or Vietnam. The solar panel on a rooftop in Rajasthan requires silicon and tellurium. The EV battery in a Tata Nexon EV contains lithium and graphite, the vast majority of which passes through Chinese processing facilities. And the Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS) or Tejas Light Combat Aircraft in India’s defence inventory requires rare earth magnets and titanium whose supply chains connect back to decisions made in Beijing. The strategic significance of this dependency cannot be overstated. As the IMPRI Impact and Policy Research Institute noted in its 2025 analysis, critical minerals are essential inputs for clean energy technologies, information and communication technologies, advanced manufacturing and defence applications — in other words, the four pillars on which India’s Viksit Bharat vision rests. [6]
India’s demand trajectory for critical minerals is steep and accelerating. The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) in its October 2024 report examined five critical minerals — cobalt, copper, graphite, lithium and nickel and found that India’s demand for all of them is expected to more than double by 2030, driven by the rapid scale-up of electric vehicles, renewable energy generation and electronics manufacturing. [7] Against this backdrop of rising demand, India today produces virtually none of the lithium or cobalt it uses, and processes only a small fraction of its rare earth elements despite possessing the world’s fifth-largest estimated REE reserves.
The gap between demand and domestic supply is not a market inefficiency; it is a strategic liability.”
China’s Dominance: The Anatomy Of A Chokehold
Understanding India’s critical mineral challenge requires understanding China’s position in the global mineral supply chain which is not simply that of a large producer, but of a vertically integrated, state-directed monopolist across multiple segments simultaneously. China’s position is the result of deliberate, decades-long investment in mining, refining and processing capacity that other nations neglected to develop, combined with the strategic foresight to recognise, long before Western governments did, that control over mineral supply chains would translate into geopolitical leverage. The USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries for 2025 document China’s dominance comprehensively. [8]
| Mineral / stage | China’s approximate global share |
| Rare earth element processing | 85% |
| Graphite production | 75% |
| Gallium production | 80% |
| Germanium production | 60% |
| Tungsten production | 82% |
| Cobalt processing | 65% |
| Lithium processing | 60% |
China accounts for approximately 85% of global rare earth element processing, 75% of global graphite production, 80% of global gallium production, 60% of global germanium production, 82% of global tungsten production, 65% of global cobalt processing, and 60% of global lithium processing. [8,9] The critical point is that these figures refer to processing and refining, not just mining. Even where raw ores are sourced from Africa (cobalt from the DRC), Latin America (lithium from the Lithium Triangle) or Australia (various minerals), the material typically passes through Chinese processing facilities before it reaches global manufacturers. This gives China control at the bottleneck of the supply chain regardless of where the ore originates.
For decades, China’s dominance was a structural reality but not an actively exercised weapon. That changed in 2023. On 3 July 2023, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) announced export licensing requirements for gallium and germanium — requiring end-use declarations and advance approval for export, a system that gave Beijing discretion to selectively delay or deny supply. [10] On 20 October 2023, MOFCOM extended similar controls to graphite, effective December 2023. In August 2024, export restrictions were imposed on antimony. On 3 December 2024, China escalated to explicit export bans on gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard materials to the United States. [10,11]
The signal these actions sent to India — even though India was not the primary target — was unmistakable. Antimony exports fell approximately 97% following the export ban and global prices for antimony trioxide roughly doubled. [12] Graphite shipments slowed significantly in early 2024 as exporters awaited licences. The 2025 restrictions on rare earth magnet export technologies — covering rare earth extraction, separation and magnet-manufacturing processes — further tightened China’s grip at the technology layer of the supply chain, not just the material layer. [9]
For India, whose defence and clean-energy programmes are intensifying exactly as China is demonstrating willingness to weaponise mineral supply chains, the conclusion is clear: reliance on China for critical mineral processing is not merely an economic inefficiency; it is a strategic exposure that must be systematically reduced.”
Writing on the global critical minerals race, The Economist has characterised the current moment as a ‘minerals scramble’ in which early movers in securing supply chains will enjoy decisive technological and economic advantages in the coming decades, while latecomers will face the same structural disadvantages that dependent economies faced during the oil shock of 1973. The parallel is exact: just as OPEC’s oil embargo forced consuming nations to confront their energy vulnerability.
China’s 2023-24 export controls have forced governments worldwide to confront their mineral vulnerability. India cannot afford to be a latecomer twice.”
India’s Response: The National Critical Mineral Mission
India’s policy response to this challenge has evolved rapidly over three years, accelerating from awareness to action in a compressed timeframe that reflects the urgency of the moment. The timeline charts this evolution.
The legal architecture underpinning India’s critical mineral strategy begins with the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and its successive amendments. The 2023 MMDR Amendment Act was the most consequential: it formally identified 30 critical minerals, placed 24 of them under exclusive Central Government authority for auction of mining leases and composite licences, removed six minerals from the ‘atomic minerals’ list to allow private sector entry through competitive auctions, and established a framework for offshore mineral exploration through amendments to the Offshore Areas Mineral (Development and Regulation) Act, 2002. [4,13] In 2024-25, the government rationalised royalty rates to make mining commercially viable and eased entry barriers for junior miners, encouraging early-stage investment. The Budget 2025-26 moved further, bringing customs duty to zero on 12 additional critical minerals and introducing a policy for recovering critical minerals from mining waste and tailings. [14]
The National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM), approved by the Union Cabinet on 29 January 2025, represents India’s most comprehensive and ambitious minerals policy instrument.”
Its financial architecture involves a total outlay of Rs.34,300 crore over seven years from FY2024-25 to FY2030-31: the government has earmarked Rs.16,300 crore in budgetary expenditure while Public Sector Undertakings are expected to invest Rs.18,000 crore.
The International Energy Agency in its policy database notes the combined commitment at approximately USD 4 billion — a substantial mobilisation, though still modest relative to the scale of investment China has made over decades. [2,15]
The NCMM is explicitly designed as a full value-chain mission, covering seven components: domestic exploration, overseas asset acquisition, mining and beneficiation, processing and refining, R&D and technology development, recycling and circularity, and regulatory reform and institutional strengthening. The Geological Survey of India (GSI) has been tasked with conducting 1,200 exploration projects by 2030-31; it had already completed 368 such projects over the preceding three years, with 195 ongoing in FY2024-25 and 227 planned for FY2025-26. [16] The Mission also includes a fast-track regulatory approval process for critical mineral projects and financial incentives for exploration in frontier and deep geological formations.
Recognising that domestic reserves alone cannot meet India’s growing demand, the Government established Khanij Bidesh India Ltd. (KABIL) as a Joint Venture of three Central PSEs — National Aluminium Company Ltd. (NALCO), Hindustan Copper Ltd. (HCL) and Mineral Exploration and Consultancy Ltd. (MECL) — with the mandate to identify, acquire, develop, mine, process and supply strategic minerals from abroad. [17] KABIL has signed an Exploration and Development contract with a state-owned company of Argentina (CAMYEN SE), securing exclusive exploration rights over 15,703 hectares in Catamarca Province for lithium exploration and mining — one of the most lithium-rich geological formations in the world. In Australia, KABIL has signed an MoU with the Critical Mineral Office (CMO) of the Department of Industry, Science and Resources (DISER) for joint due-diligence and long-term investment in lithium and cobalt assets. In Chile, KABIL has signed an NDA with ENAMI, the state-owned mining enterprise, to explore brine-type lithium blocks. [18,19]
India joined the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) — a US-led initiative involving Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the UK and the EU — which channels financial and diplomatic support toward sustainable critical energy mineral supply chains among partner nations. The MSP commits all participants to high environmental, social and governance (ESG) standards. In parallel, India has used its G20 presidency in 2023 and 2025 BRICS chairship to coordinate Global South approaches to critical minerals governance, particularly engaging Brazil and Argentina as Latin American mineral-rich partners. [20,21] The CSEP (Centre for Social and Economic Progress) has noted that India’s Geological Survey of India is already conducting mapping exercises in Zambia, demonstrating operational readiness for reciprocal data-sharing arrangements with mineral-rich developing nations. [21]
Environmental And Social Dimensions: Mining’s Negative Externalities
The urgency of mineral security cannot be allowed to become a licence for environmental recklessness.
Critical mineral mining carries significant ecological and social risks that, if not properly managed, will impose costs on affected communities, damage India’s international reputation, and ultimately undermine the sustainability of the very clean energy transition these minerals are supposed to enable.”
Mining operations for critical minerals generate a range of environmental harms. Acid mine drainage (AMD) produced when sulphide minerals in ore bodies are exposed to air and water during extraction — generates sulphuric acid and dissolves heavy metals that leach into surrounding rivers and groundwater. In states like Jharkhand and Odisha, untreated mine runoff already pollutes water sources with heavy metals and toxins, making them unsafe for drinking and agriculture. [22] Mining dust discharges elevate particulate matter concentrations that cause respiratory disease in nearby communities. Rare earth mining is particularly hazardous: REE extraction involves the use of large quantities of acids to separate economically valuable elements from ore, generating radioactive tailings and toxic leachate. Lithium extraction from brine deposits, as in the Lithium Triangle where India’s KABIL is active, involves draining large volumes of brine from underground aquifers, with impacts on water availability in already arid regions. Cobalt mining in the DRC, the world’s largest cobalt producer, has been associated with severe labour and environmental abuses at artisanal mining operations.
India’s own lithium reserves — notably the 5.9 million tonne deposit identified in Reasi district of Jammu & Kashmir, the largest found in South Asia — are located in ecologically sensitive high-altitude areas with fragile glacial hydrology. [23] Development of these reserves will require environmental impact assessments of exceptional care.
The National Green Tribunal and Supreme Court jurisprudence on mining, reinforced by the 2024 Supreme Court judgment upholding states’ power to levy additional taxes on mining, creates a complex regulatory environment that must be navigated with rigour.”
In September 2025, the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) issued an Office Memorandum exempting critical mineral mining projects — classified under national security provisions — from mandatory public hearings under the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) notification. [24] The government’s rationale is that standard EIA timelines are incompatible with the speed of project execution required to meet India’s critical mineral targets. The decision has been contested by civil society organisations and environmental scholars who argue that it weakens community consent rights and removes an important check against ecological harm. The tension here is genuine: public hearings have historically been used both as legitimate community protection mechanisms and, on occasion, as tools for organised obstruction of projects that are otherwise legally and environmentally sound.
A more calibrated solution — time-bound hearings with clear standards of representation and evidence, rather than outright exemption — would better balance the competing interests.”
Minimising Negative Impact: The Green Mining Imperative
India should embed a Green Mining Policy within the NCMM framework that sets mandatory standards for sustainable extraction. The key elements should include:
1) Zero liquid discharge (ZLD) requirements for all new critical mineral processing facilities, preventing untreated effluent from entering water bodies
2) Mandatory progressive restoration bonds, calibrated to the full cost of ecological rehabilitation, payable before mining commences and not claimable until post-closure restoration meets independently verified standards
3) Water use assessments as preconditions for mining leases in water-stressed districts, with explicit prohibitions on groundwater drawdown beyond annual recharge rates
4) Technology mandates requiring closed-loop acid recovery in REE processing facilities to reduce toxic leachate generation
5) Community benefit agreements (CBAs) as standard conditions for all critical mineral concessions, ensuring affected gram sabhas receive direct revenue sharing and local employment commitments
6) Green certification frameworks for projects in ecologically sensitive areas, with certification required before production can commence
The Rs.1,500 crore Cabinet-approved scheme for critical mineral recycling — targeting lithium, cobalt, nickel and REEs from end-of-life products — is an important complement to primary mining. [25]
Building a robust domestic recycling ecosystem reduces the volume of primary extraction required, closes material loops, creates urban mining employment and generates a secondary mineral supply base that reduces geopolitical exposure.”
The planned Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme for critical mineral recycling should be prioritised and rapidly operationalised.
Building Self-Reliance: The Road Map For India
India’s path to critical mineral self-reliance cannot rest on a single lever. A robust strategy requires simultaneous action across four pillars.
The first pillar is the acceleration of domestic exploration and beneficiation.
The GSI’s mandate to conduct 1,200 exploration projects by 2031 must be backed by investment in advanced geophysical survey technologies, AI-assisted data interpretation, and international geological data-sharing partnerships with Geoscience Australia, the British Geological Survey and the US Geological Survey. India has so far auctioned 24 critical mineral blocks under the MMDR regime; this number must scale to hundreds over the next five years, with genuinely competitive auctions that attract sophisticated global mining capital. Critically, domestic exploration must extend to offshore areas: the December 2024 announcement of the first tranche of 13 offshore mineral blocks off the coasts of Kerala, Gujarat and the Great Nicobar Islands opens a new frontier whose geological potential is only beginning to be assessed. [14,26]
The second pillar is the building of midstream processing capacity.
India’s most critical gap is not at the mining stage but at the midstream: beneficiation, refining and processing.”
The Observer Research Foundation in its 2026 analysis of India’s midstream capacity noted that most overseas KABIL projects are at an early stage, financing and technology gaps remain, and weak domestic demand for refined materials constrains the development of a processing ecosystem. [27] India must create a network of critical mineral processing clusters — potentially co-located with existing metallurgical and chemical processing hubs in Odisha, Jharkhand, Rajasthan and Gujarat — with PLI-style incentives for private investment in refining capacity. Technology transfer agreements with Australia, Japan and the European Union should be pursued aggressively under the framework of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and bilateral partnerships.
The third pillar is deepening international resource diplomacy.
KABIL’s footprint must grow beyond Argentina, Australia and Chile to encompass mineral-rich nations across Africa (Zambia, Zimbabwe, the DRC, Tanzania), Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Mongolia) and Latin America (Bolivia, Brazil). India’s development finance institutions — particularly EXIM Bank and NIIF — should provide concessional financing for strategic mining projects in partner countries, as China has done through its Belt and Road financing architecture. The key is to secure off-take agreements and equity stakes, not merely memoranda of understanding. India’s 2025 BRICS chairship and its deepening engagement with the African Union should be leveraged explicitly for mineral diplomacy. The CSEP recommendation of a Bilateral Geological Mapping Exchange programme with Argentina and Brazil, modelled on the GSI-Geoscience Australia partnership, deserves immediate implementation. [21]
The fourth pillar is investment in recycling and the circular economy.
Recycling is the only source of critical mineral supply that does not generate new environmental liabilities.”
With India generating approximately 3.2 million tonnes of e-waste annually — one of the world’s largest e-waste streams — the recycled material potential is enormous and largely untapped. Business Standard’s analysis of the circularity potential for India’s clean energy transition notes that recovered critical minerals from secondary sources can reduce material intensities in clean energy technologies, reduce import dependence and create substantial employment. [28]
A national urban mining programme, backed by PLI incentives for certified recyclers and mandatory extended producer responsibility (EPR) for electronics and battery manufacturers, would simultaneously address the e-waste crisis and build a secondary minerals supply chain.”
| Entity | Domain | Key Activity / Status |
| KABIL (JV of NALCO, HCL, MECL) | Overseas acquisition | Lithium exploration in Argentina (15,703 ha); MoU with Australia CMO; NDA with Chile ENAMI |
| Geological Survey of India (GSI) | Domestic exploration | 368 projects completed, 195 ongoing FY25, 227 planned FY26; geological mapping in Zambia |
| Atomic Minerals Directorate (AMD/DAE) | REE exploration | Coastal, riverine and hard-rock REE exploration across multiple geological domains |
| NALCO | Domestic mining + processing | Aluminium value chain; expanding into critical mineral processing alongside KABIL mandate |
| Hindustan Copper Ltd (HCL) | Copper + KABIL JV partner | Domestic copper mining; contributing expertise to KABIL overseas operations |
| Coal India Ltd (CIL) | Mineral diversification | Submitted expression of interest for Chile’s lithium RFI; exploring critical mineral adjacent opportunities |
| Tata Chemicals / Tata Motors | Downstream / EV | Battery materials processing interest; EV manufacturing driving downstream demand for NCMM outputs |
| ONGC / Indian Oil | Transition Diversification | Early-stage interest in lithium and cobalt as part of energy-transition portfolio diversification |
| IITs / CSIR / DST | R&D and technology | Research on REE processing technology, battery chemistry, mineral recycling; NCMM R&D component |
Policy Imperatives: A Ten-Point Action Agenda
For civil servants and policy makers working on India’s critical mineral security, the following action agenda distils the analysis above into concrete, time-bound recommendations.
• Constitute a National Critical Mineral Authority (NCMA) with cross-ministerial mandate, reporting to the Cabinet Secretary’s Empowered Committee, to coordinate exploration, overseas acquisition, processing and recycling as an integrated programme rather than siloed departmental activities.
• Fast-track the first 24 block auctions under the MMDR framework to commercial operation stage within three years, with mandatory performance timelines in concession agreements.
• Expand KABIL’s mandate and capital base: current commitments in Argentina, Australia and Chile are a foundation, not a strategy. KABIL needs equity capital of at least Rs.10,000 crore over five years to compete with China’s overseas acquisition machine.
• Establish three critical mineral processing clusters — in Odisha (cobalt/REE), Rajasthan (lithium/REE) and Tamil Nadu or Andhra Pradesh (maritime access for imports) — with PLI incentives and technology transfer partnerships with Japan, Australia and the EU.
• Enact a Green Mining Policy with mandatory ZLD, progressive restoration bonds, water use caps and community benefit agreements, alongside a streamlined (not exempted) EIA process with time-bound hearing windows.
• Launch an Urban Mining PLI scheme targeting e-waste recyclers for lithium, cobalt, REEs and copper recovery, aligned with mandatory EPR for electronics and EV battery manufacturers.
• Pursue technology transfer agreements under the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, Quad technology partnerships, and bilateral MOUs with Japan (REE processing), Australia (lithium) and Germany (battery chemistry).
• Create a Critical Mineral Price Stabilisation Reserve — modelled on the strategic petroleum reserve — to buffer supply disruptions and price spikes for India’s most import-dependent minerals.
• Direct MNRE, DST and industry to jointly develop PLI criteria that incentivise domestic sourcing of critical minerals, creating demand-side pull for NCMM’s supply-side outputs.
• Mainstream critical mineral security into India’s defence procurement framework: the Defence Acquisition Procedure should require mineral supply chain audits for all platform programmes involving REEs, cobalt or titanium.
Conclusion: Minerals As Strategic Infrastructure
Critical minerals are not a niche sub-sector of the mining industry. They are the physical substrate of India’s technological sovereignty — the material precondition for every EV, every solar panel, every 5G tower, every modern weapons system and every semiconductor that India aspires to produce or use. The National Critical Mineral Mission is the right institutional response to the right problem at the right time. But it is early in its implementation, underfunded relative to the scale of the challenge, and surrounded by risks — environmental, geopolitical and commercial — that require active management rather than administrative optimism.
The lesson from China’s mineral dominance is that strategic patience and consistent investment across decades creates leverage that no amount of last-minute diplomatic scrambling can quickly undo.
India does not have decades to wait. Its EVs need graphite and lithium now. Its defence industry needs REEs now. Its solar programme needs silicon and tellurium now.”
The NCMM’s seven-year horizon is the right planning frame, but the first two years 2025 and 2026 must see the institutional architecture, the overseas acquisition pipeline and the domestic processing capacity actually take shape, not merely appear in policy documents. As the RICE IAS analysis of India’s mineral strategy concluded, 2026 is “a pivot from policy ambition to implementation focus, emphasising execution at scale, speed, and depth.” [9] That is exactly the right framing for the officials and administrators who will be responsible for turning this mission into the minerals security that India needs.
References
All claims and data in this article are drawn from the sources listed below, cited in numbered order of first appearance.
[1] The Economist, coverage of the global critical minerals race, characterising critical minerals as ‘the oil of the 21st century’; see also The Economist’s special reports on clean energy supply chains and mineral geopolitics, 2023-2025.
[2] Ministry of Mines, Government of India / PIB, ‘National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM)’, January 2025 launch; total outlay Rs.34,300 crore (Rs.16,300 crore government + Rs.18,000 crore PSU), 7-year period FY2024-25 to FY2030-31.
[3] IMPRI Impact and Policy Research Institute, ‘The National Critical Mineral Mission, 2025: Securing Critical Minerals and a Clean Energy Future’, July 2025. Available at: www.impriindia.com/insights/national-critical-mineral-mission-2025/
[4] PMF IAS, ‘Critical Minerals Strategy of India’, January 2026: MMDR Amendment Act 2023; 30 critical minerals identified; 24 under Central Govt authority. Available at: www.pmfias.com/critical-minerals-of-india/
[5] Ministry of Mines, Government of India / Vajiramandravi, full list of 30 critical minerals notified under MMDR Act 1957. Available at: vajiramandravi.com/current-affairs/critical-minerals/
[6] IMPRI, ‘National Critical Mineral Mission 2025’, July 2025 (full citation at [3]): critical minerals as inputs for clean energy, ICT, advanced manufacturing and defence.
[7] Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA), ‘India’s Critical Minerals Demand’, October 2024: India’s demand for cobalt, copper, graphite, lithium and nickel to more than double by 2030.
[8] US Geological Survey (USGS), Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025: China’s global processing shares for REEs (85%), graphite (75%), gallium (80%), germanium (60%), tungsten (82%). Available at: pubs.usgs.gov/publication/mcs2025
[9] RICE IAS, ‘India’s Critical Minerals Strategy: From Policy Shift to Strategic Mainstream’, March 2026: China dominates 60-90% of processing for 20+ minerals (USGS 2025 data); 2026 as implementation pivot. Available at: riceias.com/indias-critical-minerals-strategy-from-policy-shift-to-strategic-mainstream/
[10] ORF America, ‘China’s Critical Mineral Export Controls: Background and Chokepoints’, BP-32, April 2025: gallium/germanium controls July 2023; graphite controls October 2023; antimony August 2024; full bans December 2024. Available at: orfamerica.org/newresearch/chinas-critical-mineral-export-controls
[11] FTI Consulting, ‘China’s Export Controls on Critical Minerals: Gallium, Germanium, Graphite’, December 2023. Available at: www.fticonsulting.com/insights/articles/chinas-export-controls-critical-minerals-gallium-germanium-graphite
[12] Andersen Institute, ‘China’s Export Control Architecture and Its Use of Critical Minerals as Strategic Pressure Points’, April 2026: antimony exports fell ~97%; prices roughly doubled. Available at: anderseninstitute.org/chinas-export-control-architecture
[13] Drishti IAS, ‘National Critical Mineral Mission’: MMDR Act 2023 amendments; 24 blocks auctioned; GSI exploration projects. Available at: www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/national-critical-mineral-mission
[14] CSEP (Centre for Social and Economic Progress), ‘Union Budget 2025-26: Long Road Ahead for India’s Critical Minerals’, February 2025: offshore blocks (Dec 2024, 13 blocks); customs duty reductions; waste recovery policy. Available at: csep.org/blog/union-budget-2025-26-long-road-ahead-for-indias-critical-minerals/
[15] International Energy Agency (IEA), ‘National Critical Mineral Mission’, Policy Database, April 2026: combined commitment ~USD 4 billion. Available at: www.iea.org/policies/25735-national-critical-mineral-mission
[16] PIB, Government of India, ‘National Critical Mineral Mission’, April 2025: GSI mandate for 1,200 exploration projects; 368 completed, 195 ongoing FY25, 227 planned FY26. Available at: pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2120525
[17] PIB, Government of India / IBEF, ‘KABIL Exploring Critical Mineral Assets in Argentina, Australia, Chile’, July-August 2024: KABIL established as JV of NALCO, HCL, MECL. Available at: www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2039606
[18] IBEF, ‘KABIL Exploring Opportunities for Acquisition of Overseas Critical Mineral Assets in Argentina, Australia and Chile’, August 2024: Argentina contract (CAMYEN SE), 15,703 ha Catamarca Province; Australia MoU (CMO/DISER); Chile NDA (ENAMI). Available at: www.ibef.org/news/kabil-is-exploring-opportunities-for-acquisition-of-overseas-critical-minerals-assets-in-argentina-australia-and-chile
[19] Tribune India, ‘KABIL Steps Up Overseas Exploration, Begins Lithium Project in Argentina’, November 2025. Available at: www.tribuneindia.com/news/business/kabil-steps-up-overseas-exploration-begins-lithium-project-in-argentina-ceo/
[20] Mongabay India, ‘India Approves Mission to Bridge Critical Mineral Gap in Energy Transition’, February 2025: MSP membership; bilateral agreements with Australia, Argentina, Chile, Kazakhstan. Available at: india.mongabay.com/2025/02/india-approves-mission-to-bridge-critical-mineral-gap-in-energy-transition/
[21] CSEP, ‘Latin America: A New Geography for India’s Emerging Critical Minerals Partnerships’, January 2026: Bilateral Geological Mapping; BRICS 2025 presidency; GSI-Zambia mapping. Available at: csep.org/blog/latin-america-a-new-geography-for-indias-emerging-critical-minerals-partnerships/
[22] Drishti IAS, ‘Securing India’s Critical Mineral Future’, September 2025: mine runoff in Jharkhand and Odisha; social resistance (Niyamgiri Hills); market volatility. Available at: www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-editorials/securing-indias-critical-mineral-future
[23] Drishti IAS, ‘India’s Critical Minerals Roadmap’: lithium reserves in Jammu & Kashmir (Reasi district); ecologically sensitive areas; Green Mining Policy recommendations. Available at: www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-editorials/india-s-critical-minerals-roadmap
[24] Vision IAS, ‘Critical Mineral Mining Policy Changes in India’, September 2025: MoEFCC Office Memorandum September 8, 2025 exempting critical mineral mining from mandatory public hearings.
[25] Drishti IAS, ‘Securing India’s Critical Mineral Future’, September 2025 [full citation at 22]: Cabinet-approved Rs.1,500 crore recycling scheme for lithium, cobalt, nickel, REEs.
[26] Ministry of Mines / CSEP: offshore mineral blocks, first tranche December 2024, 13 blocks off Kerala, Gujarat and Great Nicobar Islands.
[27] Observer Research Foundation (ORF), ‘Securing India’s Midstream Capacity by Processing Critical Minerals Overseas’, May 2026: KABIL projects at early stage; financing and technology gaps; midstream chokepoint. Available at: www.orfonline.org/research/securing-india-s-midstream-capacity-by-processing-critical-minerals-overseas
[28] Business Standard, ‘Circularity of Critical Minerals for India’s Clean Energy Transition’, September 2024: e-waste recycling potential; PLI for recycling; secondary mineral supply chain. Available at: www.business-standard.com/economy/news/circularity-of-critical-minerals-for-india-s-clean-energy-transition-124091000935_1.html